The United States Space Force is facing growing calls to radically reform its procurement processes to keep pace with China's rapidly advancing military space capabilities. Experts warn that current acquisition models, which can take over a decade to field new technology, are insufficient to address the threat posed by Beijing's expanding orbital presence and counterspace weaponry.
Key Takeaways
- China's orbital satellite presence has grown from 36 in 2010 to over 1,000 in 2024, alongside the development of advanced space weapons.
- Current Pentagon procurement timelines average over 12 years to deliver initial capabilities, a pace deemed too slow for the modern space race.
- Proposed reforms include shifting from written proposals to live demonstrations, adopting fixed-price contracts, and focusing on open-system architecture to foster innovation and speed.
A New Space Race Emerges
A new sense of urgency is permeating discussions around national security in space, driven by the dramatic expansion of China's capabilities. Over the last 14 years, China has increased its number of satellites in orbit by more than 2,700%, from just 36 in 2010 to over 1,000 today. This rapid growth is not just for observation or communication.
A recent Defense Intelligence Agency report highlighted that China is on track to field thousands of hypersonic glide vehicles and dozens of Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems by 2035. These systems represent a significant threat to assets both in space and on the ground.
By the Numbers: China's Space Expansion
- 2010: 36 satellites in orbit
- 2024: Over 1,000 satellites in orbit
- Projected by 2035: 4,000 hypersonic glide vehicles and 60 Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems
General Stephen Whiting of U.S. Space Command recently described the maturation of Chinese space technology as "breathtakingly fast." This assessment reflects a growing consensus that the U.S. can no longer take its dominance in the space domain for granted. The first shots of a future conflict, many now believe, could be fired in space.
Procurement Paralyzes Progress
While space technology has advanced at an exponential rate, the methods the Pentagon uses to acquire it have remained largely unchanged. The cost of launching payloads into space is now 20 times lower than it was during the Space Shuttle era, and artificial intelligence allows satellites to perform increasingly complex autonomous tasks.
Despite this explosion of commercial innovation, the Department of Defense's procurement system often struggles to keep up. A 2025 Government Accountability Office study noted that the average timeline for a major Pentagon program to deliver even an initial capability has stretched to more than 12 years.
A Historical Parallel
During World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's mandate for building the Arsenal of Democracy was simple: "speed, speed, speed." This call to action spurred rapid industrial production that was critical to the war effort. Today, a similar mandate is being called for to address the challenges in the space domain.
This slow pace is seen as a critical vulnerability. With some analysts pointing to a "window of maximum danger" with China potentially opening as soon as 2027, a 12-year development cycle for critical space assets is no longer considered viable. The challenge is not a lack of technology, but a structural inability to acquire and deploy it quickly enough.
A Blueprint for a Faster Space Force
Industry leaders and defense analysts are proposing a fundamental shift in how the Space Force buys technology, centered on three core principles designed to inject speed, efficiency, and innovation into the system.
Principle 1: From Proposals to Prototypes
The first proposed change is a move toward a "show, don't tell" model. For decades, procurement has relied on lengthy, detailed written proposals. This system favors companies skilled at writing compelling documents, not necessarily those that can build the best technology.
"No one shows up to a car dealership and asks them to submit a 300-page proposal on the performance of the car — a test drive is proof of its suitability. We must move to the same model in defense procurement."
Instead of betting billions on paper promises, this new approach would use competitions, live demonstrations, and functional prototypes to evaluate capabilities. This forces companies to prove they can deliver, weeding out those who cannot perform and ensuring contracts are awarded based on tangible results.
Principle 2: Rewarding Risk and Efficiency
The second principle involves moving away from traditional cost-plus contracts. In a cost-plus model, the government reimburses a contractor for all allowable expenses and adds a fee to generate profit. While useful for highly uncertain, long-term research, this model can reduce incentives for cost control and rapid development.
The suggested alternatives are Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) contracts and Other Transaction Agreements (OTAs). Under an FFP contract, the company assumes the risk for cost overruns, which incentivizes efficiency. OTAs, a flexible contracting tool dating back to the first space race, streamline the process and reduce administrative burdens.
This shift aims to reward companies that innovate and take calculated risks to deliver superior capabilities faster and more affordably, aligning the incentives of industry with the urgent needs of national security.
Principle 3: Embracing Open Systems
The final principle calls for a radical rethinking of data rights and intellectual property. Traditionally, the government has sought extensive data rights to avoid being locked into a single vendor's technology. However, this approach has often proven ineffective.
The proposed solution is a wider adoption of a Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA). This model focuses on creating standardized interfaces and interoperable components, much like the commercial technology sector operates. For example, Microsoft and NVIDIA collaborate by building to agreed-upon standards, allowing their separate products to work together seamlessly.
By focusing on interoperability, the Space Force could easily swap out components from different vendors, fostering continuous competition and innovation without needing to own the underlying intellectual property of every system. This approach solves the vendor-lock problem in practice, not just in theory.
The Path Forward
The U.S. Space Force has already begun to implement some of these modern acquisition strategies. General B. Chance Saltzman's Space Warfighting Framework, released in March, outlines a vision for transforming the service to maintain space superiority. Programs like the emerging Space Based Interceptor are using performance-based awards and prize competitions to spur development.
However, accelerating this transformation requires a concerted effort from both the military and its industrial partners. As Major General Stephen Purdy of Space Systems Command has stated, accountability in space acquisition is a "two-way street."
The consensus is clear: winning this second space race requires more than just advanced technology. It demands a complete reimagining of how the nation builds and deploys its power in space, ensuring that the U.S. can deter conflict and maintain security in an increasingly contested domain.